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Abstract. We consider variants of the classical stable marriage problem in
which preference lists may contain ties, and may be of bounded length. Such
restrictions arise naturally in practical applications, such as centralised match-
ing schemes that assign graduating medical students to their rst hospital posts.
In such a setting, weak stability is the most common solution concept, and it
is known that weakly stable matchings can have dierent sizes. This motivates
the problem of nding a maximum cardinality weakly stable matching, which
is known to be NP-hard in general. We show that this problem is solvable in
polynomial time if each man's list is of length at most 2 (even for women's
lists that are of unbounded length). However if each man's list is of length at
most 3, we show that the problem becomes NP-hard (even if each women's list
is of length at most 3) and not approximable within some  > 1 (even if each
woman's list is of length at most 4).
Keywords: Stable marriage problem; ties; incomplete lists; NP-hardness; polynomial-time
algorithm
1 Introduction
The Stable Marriage problem (sm) was introduced in the seminal paper of Gale and
Shapley [3]. In its classical form, an instance of sm involves n men and n women,
each of whom species a preference list, which is a total order on the members of the
opposite sex. A matching M is a set of (man,woman) pairs such that each person
belongs to exactly one pair. If (m; w) 2 M , we say that w is m's partner in M , and
vice versa, and we write M(m) = w, M(w) = m.
We say that a person x prefers y to y0 if y precedes y0 on x's preference list. A
matching M is stable if it admits no blocking pair, namely a (man,woman) pair (m; w)
A preliminary version of this paper appeared in Proceedings of ACiD 2006: the 2nd Algorithms
and Complexity in Durham workshop, volume 7 of Texts in Algorithmics, pages 95-106, College
Publications, 2006.
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such that m prefers w to M(m) and w prefers m to M(w). Gale and Shapley [3]
proved that every instance of sm admits at least one stable matching, and described
an algorithm { the Gale / Shapley algorithm { that nds such a matching in time
that is linear in the input size. In general, there may be many stable matchings (in
fact exponentially many in n) for a given instance of sm [13].
Incomplete lists. A variety of extensions of the basic problem have been studied.
In the Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists (smi), the numbers of men and
women need not be the same, and each person's preference list consists of a subset
of the members of the opposite sex in strict order. A (man,woman) pair (m; w) is
acceptable if each member of the pair appears on the preference list of the other. A
matching M is now a set of acceptable pairs such that each person belongs to at most
one pair. In this context, (m; w) is a blocking pair for a matching M if (a) (m; w)
is an acceptable pair, (b) m is either unmatched or prefers w to M(m), and likewise
(c) w is either unmatched or prefers m to M(w). Given the denitions of a matching
and a blocking pair, we lose no generality by assuming that the preference lists are
consistent (i.e., given a (man,woman) pair (m; w), m appears on the preference list of
w if and only if w appears on the preference list of m). As in the classical case, there
is always at least one stable matching for an instance of smi, and it is straightforward
to extend the Gale / Shapley algorithm to give a linear-time algorithm for this case.
Again, there may be many dierent stable matchings, but Gale and Sotomayor [4]
showed that every stable matching for a given smi instance has the same size and
matches exactly the same set of people.
Ties. An alternative extension of sm arises if preference lists are allowed to contain
ties. In the Stable Marriage problem with Ties (smt) each person's preference list is a
partial order over the members of the opposite sex in which indierence is transitive.
In other words, each person p's list can be viewed as a sequence of ties, each of length
 1; p prefers each member of a tie to everyone in any subsequent tie, but is indierent
between the members of any single tie. In this context, three denitions of stability
have been proposed [6, 11]. Among these three stability criteria, it is weak stability
that has received the most attention in the literature [15, 19, 7, 8, 9, 10, 16, 17]. A
matching M is weakly stable if there is no pair (m; w), each of whom prefers the other
to his/her partner in M . For a given instance of smt, a weakly stable matching is
bound to exist, and can be found in linear time by breaking all ties in an arbitrary
way (i.e. by strictly ranking the members of each tie arbitrarily) and applying the
Gale / Shapley algorithm.
Ties and incomplete lists. If we allow both of the above extensions of the clas-
sical problem simultaneously, we obtain the Stable Marriage problem with Ties and
Incomplete lists (smti). In this context a matching M is weakly stable if there is no
acceptable pair (m; w), each of whom is either unmatched in M or prefers the other
to his/her partner in M . Once again, it is easy to nd a weakly stable matching,
merely by breaking all the ties in an arbitrary way and applying the Gale / Shapley
algorithm. However, the ways in which ties are broken will, in general, aect the size
of the resulting matching. It is therefore natural to consider max smti, the problem
of nding a maximum cardinality weakly stable matching (henceforth a maximum
weakly stable matching), given an instance of smti. max smti turns out to be NP-
hard, even under quite severe restrictions on the number and lengths of ties [19].
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Specically, NP-hardness holds even if ties occur in the men's preference lists only,
each tie is of length 2, and each tie comprises the whole of the list in which it appears
[19]. (Note that, in the smti instance constructed by the reduction in [19], there are
men with strictly ordered preference lists of length at least 3.)
The Hospitals/Residents problem. The Hospitals/Residents problem (hr) is a
many-to-one generalisation of smi, so called because of its application in centralised
matching schemes for the allocation of graduating medical students, or residents,
to hospitals [20]. The best known such scheme is the National Resident Matching
Program (NRMP) [22] in the US, but similar schemes exist in Canada [21], in Scotland
[12, 23], and in a variety of other countries and contexts. In fact, this extension of sm
was also discussed by Gale and Shapley under the name of the College Admissions
problem [3]. In an instance of hr, each resident has a preference list containing a
subset of the hospitals, and each hospital ranks the residents for which it is acceptable.
In addition, each hospital has a quota of available posts. In this context, a matching
is a set of acceptable (resident,hospital) pairs so that each resident appears in at
most one pair and each hospital in a number of pairs that is bounded by its quota.
The denition of stability is easily extended to this more general setting (see [6] for
details). It is again the case that every problem instance admits at least one stable
matching [3], and that all stable matchings have the same size [4]. Clearly smi is
equivalent to the special case of hr in which each hospital has a quota of 1.
The Hospitals / Residents problem with Ties (hrt) allows arbitrary ties in the
preference lists. The denition of weak stability can be extended in a natural way
to the hrt context [14]. Since hrt is clearly an extension of smti, the hardness
results for weak stability problems in the latter extend to the former. These results
have potentially important implications for large-scale real-world matching schemes.
It is unreasonable to expect, say, a large hospital to rank in strict order all of its
many applicants, and any articial rankings, whether submitted by the hospitals
themselves, or imposed by the matching scheme administrators, may have signicant
implications for the number of residents assigned in a stable matching.
Bounded length preference lists. In the context of many large-scale matching
schemes, the preference lists of at least one set of agents tend to be short. For example,
until recently, students participating in the Scottish medical matching scheme [12, 23]
were required to rank just three hospitals in order of preference. This naturally leads
to the question of whether the problem of nding a maximum weakly stable matching
becomes simpler when preference lists on one or both sides have bounded length.
Let (p; q)-max smti denote the restriction of max smti in which each man's list
is of length at most p and each woman's list is of length at most q. We use p = 1 or
q = 1 to denote the possibility that the men's lists or women's lists respectively are
of unbounded length. Halldorsson et al. [8] showed that (4; 7)-max smti is NP-hard
and not approximable within some  > 1 unless P=NP. Halldorsson et al. [9] gave
an alternative reduction from Minimum Vertex Cover to max smti, showing that
the latter problem is not approximable within 21
19
unless P=NP. By starting from the
NP-hard restriction of Minimum Vertex Cover to graphs of maximum degree 3 [5],
the same reduction shows NP-hardness for (5; 5)-max smti.
In this paper we consider other values of p and q, to identify the `borderline'
between polynomial-time solvability and NP-hardness for (p; q)-max smti. We show
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in Section 2 that (2;∞)-max smti is polynomial-time solvable using a combination
of an adapted version of the Gale / Shapley algorithm together with a reduction to
the Assignment problem. By contrast, in Section 3 we show that (3; 3)-max smti is
NP-hard, even if the ties belong to the preference lists of one sex only. In Section 4 we
give an inapproximability result, namely that (3; 4)-max smti is not approximable
within some  > 1 unless P=NP. Finally, in Section 5 we present some concluding
remarks.
2 Algorithm for (2,∞)-max smti
In this section we present a polynomial-time algorithm for max smti where the
preference lists of both men and women may contain ties, the men's lists are of length
at most 2 and the women's lists are of unbounded length. Let I be an instance of
this problem, and let n1 and n2 be the numbers of men and women respectively in I.
Consider the algorithm (2;∞)-max-smti-alg shown in Figure 1. The algorithm
consists of three phases, where each phase is highlighted in the gure. We use the term
reduced lists to refer to participants' lists after any deletions made by the algorithm.
Phase 1 of (2;∞)-max-smti-alg is a simple extension of the Gale / Shapley algorithm,
and is used to delete certain (man,woman) pairs that can never be part of any weakly
stable matching. To \delete the pair (mi; wj)", we delete mi from wj's list and delete
wj from mi's list. Phase 1 proceeds as follows. All men are initially unmarked. While
some man mi remains unmarked and mi has a non-empty reduced list, we set mi to
be marked { it is possible that mi may again become unmarked at a later stage of
the execution. If mi's reduced list is not a tie of length 2, we let wj be the woman
in rst position in mi's reduced list. Then, for each strict successor mk of mi on wj's
list, we delete the pair (mk; wj) and set mk to be unmarked (regardless of whether or
not he was already marked).
We remark that the following situation may occur during phase 1. Suppose that
some man mi is indierent between two women wj and wk on his original preference
list, and suppose that during some iteration of the while loop he becomes marked.
We note that the algorithm does not delete the strict successors of mi on wj's list at
this stage. Now suppose that, during a subsequent loop iteration, the pair (mi; wk)
is deleted. Then mi becomes unmarked, only to be re-marked during a subsequent
loop iteration. This re-marking results in the deletions of all pairs (mr; wj), where
mr is a strict successor of mi on wj's list, as required.
In phase 2 we construct a weighted bipartite graph G and nd a minimum cost
maximum matching in G using the algorithm in [2]. The graph G is constructed
using Algorithm BuildGraph shown in Figure 2. That is, each man and woman is
represented by a vertex in G, and for each man mi on woman wj's reduced list, we
add an edge from mi to wj with cost rank(wj; mi), where rank(wj; mi) is the rank
of mi on wj's reduced list (i.e. 1 plus the number of strict predecessors of mi on wj's
reduced list). We then nd a minimum cost maximum matching MG in G.
In general, after phase 2, MG need not be weakly stable in I. In particular,
some man mi who has a reduced list of length 2 that is strictly ordered may be
assigned to his second-choice woman wk in MG, while his rst-choice woman wj may
be unassigned in MG. Clearly (mi; wj) blocks such a matching. To obtain a weakly
stable matching M from MG we execute phase 3. Initially M is set to be equal to MG.
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/* Phase 1 */
set all men to be unmarked;
while (some man mi is unmarked and
mi has a non-empty reduced list) do
set mi to be marked;
if mi's reduced list is not a tie of length 2 then
wj := woman in rst position on mi's reduced list;
for each strict successor mk of mi on wj's list do
set mk to be unmarked;
delete the pair (mk; wj);
/* Phase 2 */
G := BuildGraph();
MG := minimum cost maximum matching in G;
/* Phase 3 */
M := MG;
while (there exists a man mi who is assigned
to his second-choice woman wk in M
and his rst-choice woman wj is unassigned in M) do
M := M \ {(mi; wk)};
M := M ∪ {(mi; wj)};
return M ;
Figure 1: Algorithm (2;∞)-max-smti-alg.
Next, we move each such mi to his rst-choice woman. We note that mi must be in
the tail of wj's reduced list (this is the set of one or more entries tied in last place on
wj's reduced list) since mi must have been marked during Phase 1, causing all strict
successors of mi on wj's list to be deleted. Further, we note that there may exist
more than one such man in wj's tail who satisfy the above criterion. Moreover when
mi moves to wj, wk becomes unassigned in M . As a result, there may be some other
man mr (who strictly ranks wk in rst place) who now satises the loop condition.
This process is repeated until no such man exists. Upon termination of phase 3 we
will show that the matching M returned is a maximum weakly stable matching.
We begin by showing that the algorithm (2;∞)-max-smti-alg terminates. It is
easy to see that each of phases 1 and 2 is bound to terminate. The following lemma
shows that the same is true for phase 3.
Lemma 1. Phase 3 of (2;∞)-max-smti-alg terminates.
Proof. We show that the while loop terminates during an execution E of phase 3.
For, at a given iteration of the while loop of phase 3, let mi be some man assigned
to his second-choice woman wk in M and suppose that his rst-choice woman wj is
unassigned in M , where mi's reduced list is of length 2 and is strictly ordered. Then
during E, mi switches from wk to wj. Hence each such mi must strictly improve (in
fact mi can only improve at most once). Therefore since the number of men is nite,
phase 3 is bound to terminate.
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V := M∪W; // M and W are the sets of men and women in I respectively
E := ∅;
for each man mi ∈M do
for each woman wj on mi's reduced list do
E := E ∪ {(mi; wj)};
cost(mi; wj) := rank(wj ;mi);
G := (V;E);
return G;
Figure 2: Algorithm BuildGraph.
We next show that phase 1 of (2;∞)-max-smti-alg never deletes a weakly stable
pair, which is a (man,woman) pair that belongs to some weakly stable matching in
I.
Lemma 2. The algorithm (2;∞)-max-smti-alg never deletes a weakly stable pair.
Proof. Let (mi; wj) be a pair deleted during an execution E of (2;∞)-max-smti-alg
such that (mi; wj) 2 M , where M is a weakly stable matching in I. Without loss of
generality suppose this is the rst weakly stable pair deleted during E. Then mi was
deleted from wj's list during some iteration q of the while loop of phase 1 during E.
This deletion was made as a result of wj being in rst position in the reduced list of
some man mr, where mr's reduced list was not a tie of length 2, and wj prefers mr to
mi. Then in M , mr must obtain a woman ws such that mr either prefers ws to wj or is
indierent between them, otherwise (mr; wj) blocks M . Therefore during E, in both
cases (mr; ws) must have already been deleted before iteration q, a contradiction.
Finally we prove that the matching returned by (2;∞)-max-smti-alg is weakly
stable in I.
Lemma 3. The matching returned by algorithm (2;∞)-max-smti-alg is weakly sta-
ble in I.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that the matching M output by the algorithm
(2;∞)-max-smti-alg is not weakly stable. Then there exists a pair (mi; wj) that
blocks M . We consider the following four cases corresponding to a blocking pair.
Case (i): both mi and wj are unassigned in M . Then mi is unassigned in MG,
and either wj is unassigned in MG or becomes unassigned during phase 3. First
suppose that wj is unassigned in MG. Then the size of the matching MG could be
increased by adding the edge (mi; wj) to MG, contradicting the maximality of MG.
Now suppose that wj became unassigned as a result of phase 3. Let mp1 denote wj's
partner in MG. Then during phase 3, mp1 must have become assigned to his rst-
choice woman wq1. Suppose wq1 was unassigned in MG. Then we can nd a larger
matching by augmenting along the path (mi; wj); (wj; mp1); (mp1; wq1), contradicting
the maximality of MG. Therefore wq1 must have been assigned in MG and became
unassigned as a result of phase 3. Hence the man mp2, to whom wq1 was assigned in
MG, switched to his rst-choice woman wq2. Using an argument similar to that above
for wq1, we can show that wq2 must be assigned in MG. Therefore some man switched
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from wq2 during phase 3 to his rst-choice woman. If we continue this process, since
each man must strictly improve and the number of men is nite, there exists a nite
number of women that can become unassigned as a result of phase 3. Hence at some
point there exists a man mpr who switches to his rst-choice woman wqr and wqr
was already unassigned in MG. We can then construct an augmenting path in G
of the form (mi; wj); (wj; mp1); (mp1; wq1); (wq1; mp2); (mp2; wq2); : : : ; (mpr ; wqr), which
contradicts the maximality of MG.
Case (ii): mi is unassigned in M and wj prefers mi to her assignee mk in M . Then
mi is unassigned in MG. Suppose that wj is assigned to mk in MG. As wj prefers mi
to mk, we could obtain a matching with a smaller cost, but with the same size, by
removing (mk; wj) and adding (mi; wj) to MG, a contradiction. Now suppose that wj
is not assigned to mk in MG. Then wj is either unassigned in MG or wj is assigned in
MG to mr, where mr 6= mk and mr 6= mi. If wj is unassigned in MG, we contradict
the maximality of MG. Now suppose wj is assigned to mr in MG. Then since wj is
no longer assigned to mr in M , mr must have switched to his rst-choice woman ws
during phase 3. Therefore either ws is unassigned in MG or ws became unassigned
as a result of some man switching from ws to his rst-choice woman. Again using a
similar argument to that in Case (i) we obtain an augmenting path that contradicts
the maximality of MG.
Case (iii): mi is assigned to ws in M and mi prefers wj to ws and wj is unassigned
in M . Thus clearly mi's list is of length 2 and does not contain a tie, and wj is
mi's rst-choice woman. In this situation the loop condition of phase 3 is satised.
Therefore since the algorithm terminates (Lemma 1) this situation can never arise.
Case (iv): mi is assigned to ws in M and mi prefers wj to ws, and wj is assigned to
mr in M and wj prefers mi to mr. Thus again mi's list cannot contain a tie, and wj
is his rst-choice woman. Therefore either mi proposed to wj during phase 1 or wj
was deleted from mi's list. Hence mr would have been deleted from wj's list during
phase 1, so it is then impossible that (mr; wj) 2 M .
Since phase 1 of the algorithm never deletes a weakly stable pair (by Lemma 2),
a maximum weakly stable matching must consist of (man,woman) pairs that belong
to the reduced lists. We next note that G is constructed from the reduced lists, and
since we nd a maximum matching in G, the matching output by the algorithm must
indeed be a maximum weakly stable matching (by Lemma 3, and since phase 3 does
not change the size of the matching output by the algorithm: every man matched in
MG is also matched in M).
The time complexity of the algorithm is dominated by nding the minimum cost
maximum matching in G = (V; E). The required matching in G can be constructed
in O(
√
jEjjV j log jV j) time [2]. Let n = jV j = n1 + n2. Since jEj  2n1 = O(n), it
follows that (2;∞)-max-smti-alg has time complexity O(n
3
2 log n).
We summarise the results of this section in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Given an instance I of (2;∞)-max smti, algorithm (2;∞)-max-smti-
alg returns a weakly stable matching of maximum size in O(n
3
2 log n) time, where n
is the total number of men and women in I.
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x4i : y4i c(x4i) y4i+1 (0  i  n  1)
x4i+1 : y4i+1 c(x4i+1) y4i+2 (0  i  n  1)
x4i+2 : y4i+3 c(x4i+2) y4i+2 (0  i  n  1)
x4i+3 : y4i c(x4i+3) y4i+3 (0  i  n  1)
psj : zj c
s
j (1  j  m ^ 1  s  3)
qj : c
1
j c
2
j c
3
j (1  j  m)
y4i : (x4i x4i+3) (0  i  n  1)
y4i+1 : (x4i x4i+1) (0  i  n  1)
y4i+2 : (x4i+1 x4i+2) (0  i  n  1)
y4i+3 : (x4i+2 x4i+3) (0  i  n  1)
csj : p
s
j x(c
s
j) qj (1  j  m ^ 1  s  3)
zj : (p
1
j p
2
j p
3
j) (1  j  m)
Figure 3: Preference lists in the constructed instance of (3; 3)-com smti.
3 NP-hardness of (3, 3)-max smti
In this section we show that, in contrast to the case for (2;∞)-max smti, (3; 3)-max
smti is NP-hard. The result holds even if the ties belong to the preference lists of
one sex only. In fact we will show that (3; 3)-com smti is NP-complete { this is the
problem of deciding, given an instance of smti in which all preference lists are of
length at most 3, whether a complete weakly stable matching (i.e., a weakly stable
matching in which everyone is matched) exists. The NP-completeness of (3; 3)-com
smti clearly implies the NP-hardness of (3; 3)-max smti.
Our proof of this result uses a reduction from a restricted version of sat. More
specically, let (2,2)-e3-sat denote the problem of deciding, given a Boolean formula
B in CNF in which each clause contains exactly 3 literals and, for each vi 2 V , each
of literals vi and vi appears exactly twice in B, whether B is satisable. Berman et
al. [1] showed that (2,2)-e3-sat is NP-complete.
Theorem 5. (3; 3)-com smti is NP-complete. The result holds even if the ties belong
to the preference lists of one sex only.
Proof. Let B be an instance of (2,2)-e3-sat. Let V = fv0; v1; : : : ; vn 1g and C =
fc1; c2; : : : ; cmg be the set of variables and clauses respectively in B. Then for each
vi 2 V , each of literals vi and vi appears exactly twice in B. (Hence m =
4n
3
.) Also
jcjj = 3 for each cj 2 C. We form an instance I of (3; 3)-com smti as follows.
The set of men in I is X [ P [ Q, where X = [n 1i=0 Xi, Xi = fx4i+r : 0  r  3g
(0  i  n   1), P = [mj=1Pj, Pj = fp
1
j ; p
2
j ; p
3
jg (1  j  m) and Q = fqj : cj 2 Cg.
The set of women in I is Y [ C 0 [ Z, where Y = [n 1i=0 Yi, Yi = fy4i+r : 0  r  3g
(0  i  n  1), C 0 = fcsj : cj 2 C ^ 1  s  3g and Z = fzj : cj 2 Cg.
The preference lists of the men and women in I are shown in Figure 3. In a given
preference list, entries within round brackets are tied. In the preference list of an
agent x4i+r 2 X (0  i  n   1 and r 2 f0; 1g), the symbol c(x4i+r) denotes the
woman csj 2 C
0 such that the (r + 1)th occurrence of literal vi appears at position
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s of cj. Similarly if r 2 f2; 3g then the symbol c(x4i+r) denotes the woman c
s
j 2 C
0
such that the (r  1)th occurrence of literal vi appears at position s of cj. Also in the
preference list of an agent csj 2 C
0, if literal vi appears at position s of clause cj 2 C,
the symbol x(csj) denotes the man x4i+r 1 where r = 1; 2 according as this is the rst
or second occurrence of literal vi in B. Otherwise if literal vi appears at position s of
clause cj 2 C, the symbol x(c
s
j) denotes the man x4i+r+1 where r = 1; 2 according as
this is the rst or second occurrence of literal vi in B. Clearly each preference list is
of length at most 3, and the ties belong to the women's preference lists only.
For each i (0  i  n   1), let Ti = f(x4i+r; y4i+r) : 0  r  3g and Fi =
f(x4i+r; y4i+r+1)g : 0  r  3g, where addition is taken modulo 4.
We claim that B is satisable if and only if I admits a complete weakly stable
matching.
For, let f be a satisfying truth assignment of B. Dene a complete matching M
in I as follows. For each variable vi 2 V , if vi is true under f , add the pairs in Ti to
M , otherwise add the pairs in Fi to M . Now let cj 2 C. As cj contains a literal that
is true under f , let s 2 f1; 2; 3g denote the position of cj in which this literal occurs.
Add the pairs (ptj; c
t
j) (1  t 6= s  3), (p
s
j; zj) and (qj; c
s
j) to M .
As M is a complete matching in I, clearly no woman in Y [Z can be involved in
a blocking pair of M in I. Nor can a man in P (since he can only potentially prefer a
woman in Z) nor a man in Q (since he can only potentially prefer a woman in C, who
ranks him last). Now suppose that (x4i+r; c(x4i+r)) blocks M , where 0  i  n 1 and
0  r  3. Let csj = c(x4i+r), where 1  j  m and 1  s  3. Then (qj; c
s
j) 2 M . If
r 2 f0; 1g then (x4i+r; y4i+r+1) 2 M , so that vi is false under f . But literal vi occurs
in cj, a contradiction, since literal vi was supposed to be true under f by construction
of M . Hence r 2 f2; 3g and (x4i+r; y4i+r) 2 M , so that vi is true under f . But literal
vi occurs in cj, a contradiction, since literal vi was supposed to be true under f by
construction of M . Hence M is weakly stable in I.
Conversely suppose that M is a complete weakly stable matching in I. We form
a truth assignment f in B as follows. For each i (0  i  n   1), M \ (Xi  Yi)
is a perfect matching of Xi [ Yi. If M \ (Xi  Yi) = Ti, set vi to be true under f .
Otherwise M \ (Xi  Yi) = Fi, in which case we set vi to be false under f .
Now let cj be a clause in C (1  j  m). There exists some s (1  s  3) such
that (qj; c
s
j) 2 M . Let x4i+r = x(c
s
j) for some i (0  i  n   1) and r (0  r  3).
If r 2 f0; 1g then (x4i+r; y4i+r) 2 M by the weak stability of M . Thus variable vi
is true under f , and hence clause cj is true under f , since literal vi occurs in cj. If
r 2 f2; 3g then (x4i+r; y4i+r+1) 2 M (where addition is taken modulo 4) by the weak
stability of M . Thus variable vi is false under f , and hence clause cj is true under f ,
since literal vi occurs in cj. Hence f is a satisfying truth assignment of B.
4 Inapproximability of (3, 4)-max smti
In this section we give an inapproximability result for (3; 4)-max smti. Specically,
we show that (3; 4)-max smti is not approximable within , for some  > 1, unless
P=NP. Our proof involves a reduction from a problem involving matchings in graphs.
A matching M in a graph G is said to be maximal if no proper superset of M is a
matching in G. Dene min-mm to be the problem of nding a minimum cardinality
maximal matching, given a graph G. By [8, Theorem 1], min-mm is not approximable
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within some 0 > 1 unless P=NP. The result holds even for subdivision graphs of
cubic graphs. (Given a graph G, the subdivision graph of G, denoted by S(G), is
obtained by subdividing each edge fu; wg of G in order to obtain two edges fu; vg
and fv; wg of S(G), where v is a new vertex.)
Theorem 6. (3; 4)-max smti is NP-hard and not approximable within , for some
 > 1, unless P=NP.
Proof. Let G be an instance of min-mm restricted to subdivision graphs of cubic
graphs. Then G = (U; W; E) is a bipartite graph where, without loss of gener-
ality, each vertex in U has degree 2 and each vertex in W has degree 3. Let
U = fm1; : : : ; msg and let W = fw1; : : : ; wtg. For each vertex mi 2 U , let Wi
denote the two vertices adjacent to mi in G. Similarly for each vertex wj 2 W , let
Uj denote the three vertices adjacent to wj in G. We construct an instance I of
(3; 4)-max smti as follows: let U [ X be the set of men and let W [ Y be the set
of women, where X = fx1; : : : ; xtg and Y = fy1; : : : ; ysg. The preference lists of the
men and women in I are as follows:
mi : (Wi) yi (1  i  s) wj : (Uj) xj (1  j  t)
xi : wi (1  i  t) yj : mj (1  j  s)
In a given preference list, entries within round brackets are tied. Clearly the length of
each man's preference list is at most 3, whilst the length of each woman's preference
list is at most 4. We claim that s+(I) = s + t    1 (G), where s
+(I) denotes the
maximum size of a weakly stable matching in I and  1 (G) denotes the minimum size
of a maximal matching in G.
For suppose that G has a maximal matching M , where jM j =  1 (G). We con-
struct a matching M 0 in I as follows. Initially let M 0 = M . There remain s   jM j
men in U that are unmatched in M 0; denote these men by mir (1  i  s   jM j),
and add (mir ; yir) to M
0 for each such mir . Finally there remain t   jM j women
in W that are unmatched in M 0; denote these women by wjr (1  r  t   jM j),
and add (xjr ; wjr) to M
0 for each such wjr . Clearly M
0 is a matching in I such that
jM 0j = jM j + (s  jM j) + (t   jM j) = s + t    1 (G). It is straightforward to verify
that M 0 is weakly stable in I, and hence s+(I)  s + t   1 (G).
Conversely suppose that M 0 is a weakly stable matching in I, where jM 0j = s+(I).
Let M = M 0 \ E. The weak stability of M 0 in I implies that M is maximal in G.
Moreover, at most t   jM j women in W are matched in M 0 to men in X, and at
most s   jM j men in U are matched in M 0 to women in Y , and hence jM 0j 
jM j+ (t  jM j) + (s  jM j) = s + t  jM j. Thus s+(I)  s + t   1 (G). Hence the
claim is established.
Theorem 1 of [8] shows that it is NP-hard to distinguish between the cases that
 1 (G)  c0m and 
 
1 (G) > 0c0m, where c0 > 0 is some constant and m = jEj. Now
if  1 (G)  c0m then s
+(I)  cs, whilst if  1 (G) > 0c0m then s
+(I) < cs, where
c = (5  6c0)=3 and  = (5  60c0)=(5  6c0). The result follows by Theorem 1 and
Proposition 4 of [8].
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have presented a polynomial-time algorithm for (2;∞)-max smti,
but have shown that, by contrast, (3; 3)-max smti is NP-hard and (3; 4)-max smti
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is not approximable within some  > 1 unless P=NP.
For the NP-hard variants of (p; q)-max smti, it remains to investigate the ex-
istence of approximation algorithms for these problems that improve on the perfor-
mance guarantees of those that have already been formulated for the general smti
case (with no assumptions on the lengths of the preference lists) [19, 9, 16, 17, 18].
Also, the natural extension of (p; q)-max smti to the many-one hrt case may
be formulated: we denote this problem by (p; q)-max hrt. It remains to extend
the algorithm for (2;∞)-max smti to the case of (2;∞)-max hrt or prove that the
latter problem is NP-hard. Clearly Theorem 5 implies that (3; 3)-max hrt is NP-
hard, whilst Theorem 6 implies that (3; 4)-max hrt is NP-hard and not approximable
within some  > 1 unless P=NP.
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